The modular and most adaptive version of Windows 10 is currently called ‘Windows 10X’ and it’ll be arriving on traditional single-screen laptops in the first half of 2021. Windows 10’s modular version was first announced in October 2019 and Microsoft originally said that the Surface Neo would be the first device to run the new OS. However, everything has changed after Microsoft started preparing Windows 10X for single-screen devices in an effort to meet the current needs of the customers. Microsoft has also removed the Surface Neo listing to clarify it’s not coming this holiday season. At the moment, we’re not sure if Microsoft will publish the beta builds of Windows 10X to the testers in the Insider, which raises fresh questions and concerns about exactly how the OS might work. Windows 10X is also known as Windows Lite internally and it’s based on Windows Core OS, which modularizes Windows Shell and other components. This new operating system is designed to run on both single-screen and dual-screen form factors, and it’s also modern without legacy components. In addition, Windows 10X comes with a new user interface that ditches live tiles support for icons and it also allows Windows Update to happen seamlessly in the background. According to sources, Microsoft is currently planning to deliver Windows 10X sometime in the first half of 2021 without native support for Win32 apps. The first single-screen Windows 10X PCs are also set to arrive in the second quarter or Spring of 2021. To make room for Windows 10X launch, Microsoft also appears to be considering changes to its Windows 10 upgrade cycle. Going forward, Windows 10 will receive only one feature update per year and next year’s feature update is expected to arrive after Windows 10X launches in the market. After the launch of Windows 10X in Q2 2021, Microsoft will begin rolling out the first feature update for Windows 10. In the spring of 2022, we’ll see the first big Windows 10X feature update that will add support for dual-screen hardware, such as Surface Neo and Lenovo ThinkPad Fold. Unfortunately, Microsoft has reportedly removed the virtualization technology from the internal builds of Windows 10X. This would have allowed Win32 apps (desktop or classic apps) to run smoothly in a container. Microsoft is not satisfied with the performance of Win32 apps on Windows 10X due to limitations. For example, some Win32 apps are struggling to access the native features available outside the container, which includes screen sharing and alerts when apps are minimized to the taskbar. This is the opposite of the Windows 10X ethos, which is supposed to offer both performance and compatibility at the same time. As a result, Windows 10X internal builds have dropped support for Win32 apps. You can only run UWP and web apps natively, which would turn Windows 10X into a proper lightweight OS for Chromebook-like devices. Microsoft will allow early adopters to stream Win32 apps via a web service, which works only when you have an internet connection. While the plans are always subject to change, Microsoft has internally decided not to move forward with the dual-screen model for another year. For more on this visit OUR FORUM often.

FEDERAL AGENTS from the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department used “a sophisticated cell phone cloning attack—the details of which remain classified—to intercept protesters’ phone communications” in Portland this summer, Ken Klippenstein reported this week in The Nation. Put aside for the moment that, if the report is true, federal agents conducted sophisticated electronic surveillance against American protesters, an alarming breach of constitutional rights. Do ordinary people have any hope of defending their privacy and freedom of assembly against threats like this? Without more details, it’s hard to be entirely sure what type of surveillance was used, but The Nation’s mention of “cell phone cloning” makes me think it was a SIM cloning attack. This involves duplicating a small chip used by virtually every cellphone to link itself to its owner’s phone number and account; this small chip is the subscriber identity module, more commonly known as SIM.  SIM cards contain a secret encryption key that is used to encrypt data between the phone and cellphone towers. They’re designed so that this key can be used (like when you receive a text or call someone) but so the key itself can’t be extracted. But it’s still possible to extract the key from the SIM card, by cracking it. Older SIM cards used a weaker encryption algorithm and could be cracked quickly and easily, but newer SIM cards use stronger encryption and might take days or significantly longer to crack. It’s possible that this is why the details of the type of surveillance used in Portland “remain classified.” Do federal agencies know of a way to quickly extract encryption keys from SIM cards? (On the other hand, it’s also possible that “cell phone cloning” doesn’t describe SIM cloning at all but something else instead, like extracting files from the phone itself instead of data from the SIM card.) Assuming the feds were able to extract the encryption key from their target’s SIM card, they could give the phone back to their target and then spy on all their target’s SMS text messages and voice calls going forward. To do this, they would have to be physically close to their target, monitoring the radio waves for traffic between their target’s phone and a cell tower. When they see it, they can decrypt this traffic using the key they stole from the SIM card. This would also fit with what the anonymous former intelligence officials told The Nation; they said the surveillance was part of a “Low-Level Voice Intercept” operation, a military term describing audio surveillance by monitoring radio waves. Even if law enforcement agencies don’t clone a target’s SIM card, they could gather quite a bit of information after temporarily confiscating the target’s phone. They could power off the phone, pop out the SIM card, put it in a separate phone, and then power that phone on. If someone sends the target an SMS message (or texts a group that the target is in), the feds’ phone would receive that message instead of the target’s phone. And if someone called the target’s phone number, the feds’ phone would ring instead. They could also hack their target’s online accounts, so long as those accounts support resetting the password using a phone number. But, in order to remain stealthy, they would need to power off their phone, put the SIM card back in their target’s phone, and power that phone on again before returning it, which would restore the original phone’s access to the target’s phone number, and the feds would lose access. Read this entire posting on OUR FORUM.